Các văn kiện dẫn chứng

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 1

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 2

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 2b

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 3

TOÀ SUPERIOR TIỂU BANG MASSACHUSETTS

Vụ Kiện số: 01-4507

NGUYÊN ĐƠN: Nguyễn Hữu Luyện

BỊ CÁO

Trung Tâm William Joiner Nghiên Cứu Về Chiến Tranh và Những Hậu Quả Xã Hội

Thuộc Trường Đại Học Massachusetts Boston

BẢN GHI NHỚ VỀ PHÁN QUYẾT VÀ ÁN LỆNH CỦA TÒA

LIÊN QUAN ĐẾN ĐƠN THỈNH CẦU CỦA BỊ CÁO XIN BÁC BỎ VỤ KIỆN

Đây là một vụ tố tụng viện lý rằng có sự kỳ thị trong phương cách tuyển chọn mà qua đó bị cáo đã quảng cáo và chọn lựa chung quyết để cấp phát một số học bỗng cho những cá nhân trong một chương trình nhằm đẩy mạnh việc nghiên cứu bản sắc người Việt trong kỷ nguyên hậu chiến tranhViệt Nam. Nhóm nguyên đơn nhìn nhận là họ đã không hề nạp đơn dự tranh học bỗng này, thế nhưng đã đệ nạp trong Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai với ba điểm luận tội mà họ cho là vi phạm tinh thần của các điều khoản G.1.c. 151B và 151C. Bị cáo nay đệ nạp đơn thỉnh cầu Tòa bác bỏ đơn khiếu tố này, căn cứ vào các điều luật 12(b) (1) và 12(b) (6) Mass.R.Civ.P. Nay Tòa quyết định rằng, Thỉnh cầu của bị cáo phải được CHẤP THUẬN bởi những lý lẽ sau đây:

NỘI DUNG VỤ KIỆN

Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai (của nguyên đơn) đã nêu ra một số luận chứng liên hệ sau đây mà căn cứ vào đó Tòa xét thấy là phù hợp với những mục tiêu Thỉnh cầu của bị cáo. Vào hôm 29-7-1999, bị cáo gồm William Joiner Center (nay gọi tắt là “Trung Tâm”)

và Trường Đại Học University of Massachusetts (nay gọi tắt là “Trường Đại Học”) đã nhận được từ cơ quan Rockefeller Foundation of NewYork một ngân khoản tài trợ cho chương trình nghiên cứu có đề tài là “Tái Cấu Trúc Bản Sắc và Vị Trí của Cộng Đồng Người Việt Hải Ngoại.” Mục tiêu của cuộc nghiên cứu này là nhằm khảo sát “những cấu trúc đa dạng trong bản sắc của coäng đồng người Việt đã được định hình và tái định hình như thế nào trong thời hậu chiến tranh và hậu tỵ nạn xuyên qua các thế hệ” sau cuộc chiến Việt Nam. Những học bỗng này đều có tính cách tạm thời được cấp phát từng năm một. Những tham dự viên của học bỗng này được hưởng một số ưu tiên dành cho ban giảng huấn của trường cụ thể như được tham khảo các tài liệu của thư viện của trường Đại học, được cung cấp văn phòng riêng tại Trung Tâm.

Nhóm nguyên đơn gồm những người trên 40 tuổi, tất cả đều được sinh trưởng tại miền Nam Việt Nam. Một số là những sĩ quan của Quân Lực miền Nam trong thời kỳ chiến tranh VN. Những người còn lại là những quan chức của chính phủ miền Nam, những nhà giáo dục và ký giả. Tất cả họ đều đã di dân đến Hoa Kỳ ngay sau khi chính phủ Sài gòn sụp đổ và những năm sau đó. Nguyễn Hữu Luyện là nguyên đơn duy nhất định cư tại Boston.

Trung Tâm đã cho công bố những thông tin liên quan đến việc cấp phát học boång vào hôm 4 tháng Giêng năm 2000. Họ đã làm công việc này qua một Thông cáo báo chí, và một thư thông báo cũng như cho đăng quảng cáo trên hai tờ báo Việt ngữ, Hợp Lưu và Văn Học. Thời hạn chót để nạp đơn cho học bỗng này là ngày 31 tháng Giêng năm 2000. Bốn ứng viên đã được chấp thuận. Trong đó kể cả một nhóm gồm “hai người nhìn nhận họ là đảng viên Cộng sản” đã di dân đến Mỹ từ miền Bắc Việt Nam, một người “Mỹ gốc da trắng” sinh đẻ tại Mỹ dưới 40 tuổi, và một người Mỹ gốc Việt cũng dưới 40 tuổi.

Không có ai trong nhóm nguyên đơn nhận được những thông tin liên quan đến học bỗng này trước ngày hết hạn 31-1-2000. Nguyễn Hữu Luyện, nguyên đơn thường trú tại Boston cũng chỉ biết đến chương trình này vào khoảng tháng 4. Nguyễn biết được là do các nguyên đơn khác cho hay. Học bỗng này đã được tiếp tục cấp phát trong các niên khoá 2001 và 2002. Không có ai trong nhóm nguyên đơn nạp đơn dự tranh.

Bởi vì bản Thỉnh Cầu Bác Bỏ vụ kiện đã nêu lên một số khía cạnh pháp lý, sự duyệt xét lại một cách tóm tắt quá trình thủ tục pháp lý liên quan đến vụ việc này cũng cần được nêu ra. Nó đã được bắt đầu với việc một đơn khiếu tố được đệ nạp cho văn phòng Ủy Ban Chống Kỳ Thị của Tiểu Bang Massachusetts (nay gọi tắt là “MCAD”) vào ngày 27-10-2000. Bản khiếu tố này đã được đưa ra bởi một cá nhân duy nhất, nguyên đơn Nguyễn Hữu Luyện, và khẳng định một tội duy nhất chống lại Trường Đại học trong việc kỳ thị về thuê mướn chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151B. Ngày 25-04-2001, Nguyễn Hữu Luyện đã tìm cách bổ túc vào hồ sơ khiếu tố để biến vụ kiện thành một vụ kiện tập thể. Bản thỉnh nguyện có tên gọi là “Bản Tu Chính vào Cáo Buộc Chống Kỳ Thị để Vụ Kiện Được Xét Xử như là Một Vụ Kiện Tập Thể,” nêu ra trong bản chỉ dẫn kèm theo hồ sơ, đã thêm vào một danh sách nguyên đơn gồm 11 cá nhân, những người yêu cầu vụ kiện được tiến hành (mà theo bản chỉ dẫn này) “một cách cá nhân đồng thời như là những đại diện cho một tập thể.” Lời yêu cầu tu chính vụ khiếu tố MCAD cuối cùng đã bị bác bỏ vào ngày 23-5-2001.

Vào ngày 22-9-2001, MCAD đã bác bỏ đơn khiếu tố của Nguyễn Hữu Luyện sau khi xét thấy không đủ yếu tố luận tội. Ngày 29-10-2001, Nguyễn Hữu Luyện đã cho tiến hành vụ kiện này, cáo buộc tội kỳ thị trong thuê mướn chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151B. Sau khi Tòa bác bỏ Thỉnh Cầu được xét xử như một vụ kiện tập thể và Nguyễn thay đổi luật sư sau khi xin tu chính đơn khiếu tố lần thứ nhất, Nguyễn đã thành công trong việc theo đuổi tu chính bản Khiếu tố lần thứ hai để thêm vào một số nguyên đơn và những buộc tội mới. Trong vòng một tháng sau khi nhận được thông báo về tu chính, bị cáo lập tức đệ nạp đơn thỉnh cầu, yêu cầu Toà hủy bỏ Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai này.

LÝ ĐOÁN VÀ TRANH BIỆN

Nhóm nguyên đơn cáo buộc rằng những hành động của bị cáo “bao gồm việc thời hạn và phương thức quảng cáo, công bố và thông báo về học bỗng, việc thẩm định và tuyển chọn ứng viên được tiến hành một cách có tính toán, không đúng đắn, bất hợp pháp nhằm mục đích loại trừ những ứng viên trong cộng đồng người Việt trên 40 tuổi, trong đó có nhóm nguyên đơn” –xem Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai dòng 42. Đơn Khiếu Tố này đòi bồi thường thiệt hại về kỳ thị trong thuê mướn chiếu điều khoản G.1.c. 151B về việc tố tụng liên quan đến chính sách đối xử phân biệt (cáo buộc I) và tác động gây ra bởi chính sách này (cáo buộc II). Thêm vào đó, nguyên đơn cũng cáo buộc có sự kỳ thị trong học vấn và đòi bồi thường thiệt hại liên quan đến việc kỳ thị trong học vấn chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151C. Quan điểm trọng tâm trong vụ kiện của nhóm nguyên đơn là, bởi vì họ là người gốc gác ở miền Nam Việt Nam có xuất xứ khác biệt với những người di dân đến Hoa Kỳ từ miền Bắc. Với việc tuyển chọn những di dân có gốc gác từ miền Bắc, có dính líu đến chế độ Cộng Sản, các bị cáo đã (được cho rằng) có hành động kỳ thị chống lại nhóm nguyên đơn một cách bất hợp pháp.

Trong Bản Ghi Nhớ về Pháp Lý hỗ trợ cho Đơn Thỉnh Cầu của bị cáo có nêu ra rất nhiều lý đoán biện minh lý do tại sao Đơn Thỉnh Cầu Bác Bỏ Vụ Kiện của họ nên được Tòa chấp thuận. Không cần phải lập lại những lời tranh biện này, Tòa chỉ lưu ý một cách đơn giản rằng những lý đoán này cung cấp những cơ sở chọn lựa để Toà đi đến kết luận rằng vụ kiện này không thể được tiến hành thêm nữa. Cụ thể như, ngoại trừ Nguyễn Hữu Luyện, không có ai trong nhóm nguyên đơn đã nạp đơn khiếu tố với MACD (1). Sự thiếu sót trong việc tận dụng các phương thức hành chánh này đồng nghĩa với việc Toà không có thẩm quyền tài phán để bàn đến những yêu sách đòi bồi thường thiệt hại của nguyên đơn chiếu theo các điều khoản G.1.c. 151B hay 151C. Xem Charland v. Muzi Motors Inc., 417 Mass. 580. 583-586 (1994). Các bị cáo cũng đưa ra một vài tranh biện đúng luật nhằm biện hộ cho sự bác bỏ ít ra là một vài yêu sách của nguyên đơn. Cụ thể như, phía bị cáo chỉ rõ rằng G.1.c. 151C, trong giới hạn của điều khoản này, chỉ bảo vệ cho “những sinh viên” xin ghi danh nhập học vào một cơ sở giáo dục, cũng như cho bất cứ “cá nhân nào xin ghi danh vào một chương trình học vấn nhằm đạt đến một học vị cao hơn Cử Nhân…” Xem G.1.c. 151C 2(a) và 2(d). Những ứng viên được (WJC) tuyển dụng trong chương trình học bỗng này không phải là sinh viên cũng không phải là những cá nhân ghi danh vào một chương trình học vấn cao cấp. Bởi thế cho nên, cáo buộc III nên được bác bỏ vì đã không nêu ra được cơ sở cho yêu sách chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151C.

Tuy nhiên, Tòa quyết định nghiêng về Thỉnh Cầu của phía bị cáo được đặt cơ sở trên sự khiếm khuyết cơ bản của phía nguyên đơn: không có ai trong số nguyên đơn đã nạp đơn dự tranh học bỗng này. Trong số những yếu tố liên quan đến một vụ án kỳ thị chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151B đòi hỏi rằng nguyên đơn phải nạp đơn dự tuyển vào công việc đó và không được tuyển dụng. Xem vụ Wynn và Wynn P.C. v. MCAD 431 Mass 655, 665 n. 22 (2000). Cũng tương tự như thế, chiếu theo điều khoản G.1.c. 151C, nguyên đơn phải cho thấy là đã cố gắng để ghi danh vào một cơ sở giáo dục hay là một chương trình học vấn nhưng bị từ chối. Trong vụ kiện này, một điều cho thấy là, ngay cả khi được thông báo về chương trình học bỗng trong mùa xuân năm 2000, không có ai trong nhóm nguyên đơn đã nạp đơn cho các niên khóa 2001 và 2002 dù rằng đang trong thời hạn nhận đơn. Cũng như đã không có bất cứ yếu tố nào cho thấy là phía bị cáo đã làm bất cứ điều gì có thể làm ngã lòng hay ngăn chặn các nguyên đơn trong việc nạp đơn. Bởi vì phía bị cáo đã không hề nhận được bất cứ đơn xin dự tuyển nào từ phía nguyên đơn thế nên không thể nói là bị cáo đã có hành động gây phương hại cho họ, cũng như phía nguyên đơn không thể chứng minh được rằng phía bị cáo đã kỳ thị họ. Nói một cách khác, phía nguyên đơn sẽ không thể nào chứng minh được là họ đã nhận chịu bất cứ thiệt hại đặc thù nào.

Phản ứng lại điều này, phía nguyên đơn cho rằng họ đã có thể nạp đơn trong năm 2000 nếu như họ đã biết có một chương trình học bỗng như thế, thế nhưng phương thức quảng cáo chương trình tự nó đã mang tính cách kỳ thị. Cũng như trong hai năm tiếp theo mà học bỗng được cấp phát, các nguyên đơn đã lập luận rằng, mặc dù họ biết có những cơ hội như thế, tuy nhiên lúc bấy giờ Nguyễn Hữu Luyện đã nạp đơn khiếu tố về kỳ thị với MCAD, thế nên tất cả các nguyên đơn đều tin rằng vào thời điểm đó, việc họ nạp đơn dự tuyển học bỗng là một việc làm có tính cách phù phiếm vô ích (*). Tòa thật khó mà chấp nhận luận điểm này.

Trước tiên, về vấn đề liên quan đến phương thức quảng cáo, sự kiện duy nhất đã được nêu ra để hỗ trợ cho cáo buộc rằng đó là một hành động có chủ ý kỳ thị là thông báo về chương trình học bỗng trong năm 2000 chỉ được công bố bằng thông cáo báo chí và thư thông báo 26 ngày trước thời gian hết hạn, và chỉ được đăng trên hai tờ báo Việt ngữ. Mặc dù điều này cho thấy là đã có sự vi phạm các điều khoản trong Bản Quy Định Chương Trình mà phía bị cáo soạn thảo, xem Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai, các dòng 29-30, Toà không thấy những dữ kiện này đủ để có thể tạo thành hành động kỳ thị một cách bất hợp pháp. Một cách khá chắc chắn là không có gì trong phương thức này làm dấy lên bất cứ một mối liên hệ hợp lý nào về việc kỳ thị tuổi tác, hoặc giả phía bị cáo cố tình hay đã gạt bỏ người Việt bằng cách không thông báo, vì thông cáo đã được đăng tải trên hai tờ báo Việt ngữ. (2)Thứ hai, đây không phải là loại tố tụng mà thuyết phù phiếm (*) được đem ra áp dụng. Thuyết này được đưa ra lần đầu tiên trong vụ kiện International Brotherhood of Teamster v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), qua việc tuyển dụng ngành tài xế đã loại bỏ những ứng viên người da đen đã cho thấy có một chính sách kỳ thị tập thể khá lộ liễu. Bằng cách giữ nguyên phán quyết của các tòa án cấp thấp nhằm mở rộng bồi thường đến cả những nguyên đơn không thực sự nạp đơn, Toà Án Tối Cao phán quyết rằng, nơi mà chính sách kỳ thị được áp dụng một cách nhất quán trong việc gạt bỏ người thiểu số, thì đó không phải là một “luật pháp cứng nhắc” về bồi thường chomột nguyên đơn cá biệt nào đã không tham dự vào hành động nạp đơn xin việc mang tính cách hoàn toàn phù phiếm. Toà đã nêu ra một thí dụ cụ thể, nếu chủ nhân dựng lên một tấm bảng nêu rõ rằng chỉ có người da trắng mới được thâu nhận thì nạn nhân của y “không phải chỉ giới hạn trong một vài người đã không đếm xỉa đến tấm bảng đó để nạp đơn và nhận chịu sự cự tuyệt.” Id.at365. Thế nhưng Toà Superior tiếp theo đó cũng đã hạn chế phán quyết của mình bằng cách nói thêm rằng những người không nạp đơn phải chứng tỏ được rằng y đã bị ngăn chặn từ trước do bởi chính sách kỳ thị.

Trong trường hợp vụ kiện này, các nguyên đơn đã không chứng tỏ cho thấy một mối quan hệ nhân quả giữa bất kỳ chính sách hay cách hành xử nào của phía bị cáo với việc không nạp đơn dự tuyển của họ để được phía bị cáo cứu xét. Ngược lại, họ cho rằng họ đã không nạp đơn vì tin rằng trong khi đơn khiếu tố của Nguyễn Hữu Luyện đang còn trong vòng cứu xét của MCAD, tất cả họ sẽ bị bác khước mặc dù họ có đầy đủ tiêu chuẩn để dự tranh. Toà không thấy rằng đây là một lý lẽ đủ để biện minh cho các nguyên đơn đòi bồi thường thiệt hại về kỳ thị do việc nạp đơn và bị bác khước.

Cuối cùng, bên cạnh những khiếm khuyết trầm trọng vừa nêu trong vụ kiện của nguyên đơn, những cố gắng của phía nguyên đơn khi tự đặt mình vào một nhóm người để được bảo vệ bởi các điều khoản G.1.c. 151B hay 151C cũng đã thất bại. Yêu sách của nguyên đơn không phải chỉ đơn giản rằng phía bị cáo đã có những hành động kỳ thị đối với những người trên 40 tuổi hoặc những người có gốc gác Việt Nam, mà hơn thế nữa, họ cho rằng phía bị cáo đã ban cấp học bỗng cho những người gia nhập hoặc thiện cảm đối với chế độ Coäng Sản miền Bắc (nay là CHXHCNVN, bao gồm cả Nam Việt Nam). Tuy nhiên, đã không có một luật lệ nào hỗ trợ cho một kết luận rằng một nhóm người được xác định bởi một niềm tin chính trị nào đó thì được dành cho sự đãi ngộ đặc biệt bởi luật lệ chống kỳ thị. Thực ra, đặt một học viện có tính hàn lâm vào trách nhiệm pháp lý vì nó đã không lựa chọn những người có quan điểm chống cộng trong các học bỗng nghiên cứu sẽ có một hậu quả đáng quan ngại đối với những quyền căn bản của Học Viện đưọc đảm bảo trong Tu Chính Án Thứ Nhất.

PHÁN QUYẾT VÀ ÁN LỆNH

Bỡi những lẽ trên cùng những luận điểm nêu ra trong Bản Ghi Nhớ về Pháp Lý của bị cáo, Đơn Thỉnh Cầu xin Bác Bỏ vụ kiện của bị cáo ĐƯỢC CHẤP NHẬN và Toà PHÁN QUYẾT rằng Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai BỊ BÁC BỎ.

Janet Sanders

Chánh Án Tòa Superior

Ngày 27-8-2004

CHÚ THÍCH:

(1) Tôi đồng ý với quan điểm của bị cáo trình bày trong phụ chú số 2 trong bản Ghi Nhớ của họ, rằng cố gắng để tu chính Đơn Khiếu Tố MCAD của Nguyễn Hữu Luyện để được tiến hành như một vụ kiện tập thể không thỏa mãn những điều kiện đòi hỏi của luật định rằng mỗi cá nhân nguyên đơn phải đệ nạp đơn khiếu tố với MCAD theo đúng thời hạn.

(2) Đơn Khiếu Tố Tu Chính Thứ Hai đã không nêu rõ tuổi tác của hai trong bốn thành viên được chấp nhận học bỗng trong năm 2000, cũng không có chỗ nào họ nêu rõ rằng chỉ có những người dưới 40 tuổi mới được chấp nhận học bỗng -một dữ kiện cần thiết, hình như thế, đối với yêu sách bồi thường của nguyên đơn về kỳ thị tuổi tác.

Hoàng Hữu Nguyên dịch

Ghi chú (*): Một vài thuật ngữ Luật học, ví dụ như “doctrine of futility” không biết có danh từ nào tương xứng trong tiếng Việt hay không, xin được qúy thức giả bổ khuyết. Tuy nhiên khái niệm này đã được giải thích bởi Chánh Án Sander trong văn bản.

§ §

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 4

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 5

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 6

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 7

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 8

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 8 (4 trang)

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 9

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 10

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 11

Law Office

Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz

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To:	Members of the Vietnamese-American Community

From:	Bradley S. Clanton

Date:	September 9, 2004

Re:	Status of Nguyen et al. v. William Joiner Center

Memorandum

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Vietnamese-American Community:

As most of you know, we are the attorneys representing the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the William Joiner Center and the University of Massachusetts, Boston. I am writing to update you on the status of the case.

It is with great disappointment that I inform you that on August 27, 2004, the Judge granted the University's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Complaint. We believe the Judge's decision was inconsistent with Massachusetts law, as outlined in our opposition to the University's Motion. Accordingly, we plan to file an immediate appeal of the Judge's decision to the Massachusetts Court of Appeals.

In the Court of Appeals, cases are typically heard by a panel of three judges. The first step will be to file a document known as a "Notice of Appeal," which merely notifies the Court and the Defendants of our intent to appeal. Then, we will file a brief with the Court of Appeals outlining our arguments against the Judge's decision dismissing the Complaint. The University will then file a brief in response, followed by our reply. The case will then be set for oral argument before the panel of judges. The appeals process is not a speedy one, and we anticipate that it could take from six months to a year for the case to be decided. In addition, it is often difficult to persuade the Court of Appeals to reverse the decision of the lower court. Yet, we will strive mightily to do just that.

I understand that this is a disappointing decision. However, please be sure that we will vigorously pursue the appeal. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need additional information.

BẢN DỊCH

Kính thưa Qúy Vị trong Cộng Đồng Người Mỹ Gốc Việt,

Như hầu hết qúy vị đã biết, chúng tôi là những luật sư đại diện cho các Nguyên Đơn trong vụ kiện chống lại William Joiner Center và trường Đại Học Massachusetts Boston. Tôi xin cập nhật tình trạng của vụ kiện để qúy vị rõ.

Chúng tôi rất thất vọng phải thông báo với qúy vị rằng ngày 27 tháng 8 năm 2004, [bà] Chánh Án đã chấp thuận Thỉnh Nguyện Thư của bị cáo xin bác bỏ Văn Bản Khởi Tố được tu chính lần thứ hai của Nguyên Đơn. Chúng tôi tin rằng phán quyết của Chánh Án không phù hợp với luật pháp của tiểu bang Massachusetts, như đã phác thảo để phản đối Thỉnh Nguyện Thư của trường đại học. Theo đó, chúng tôi phải kháng cáo ngay phán quyết của Chánh Án lên Tòa Phúc Thẩm của tiểu bang Massachusetts.

Nét đặc thù của Tòa Phúc Thẩm là các vụ án được thụ lý bởi ba vị chánh án. Giai đoạn đầu là đệ nạp “Thông Báo Chống Án” trong đó chỉ báo cho Tòa Án và bị cáo biết chúng ta quyết định chống án. Sau đó chúng ta sẽ đệ trình văn bản ngắn gọn lên Tòa Phúc Thẩm để phác thảo các luận điểm chống phán quyết của Chánh Án đã bác bỏ vụ khởi tố. Tiếp theo là trường Đại Học sẽ đệ nạp văn bản ngắn gọn để phản biện, và đến lượt chúng ta trả lời họ. Cuối cùng là vụ án sẽ được điều trần trước cả ba vị Chánh Án. Quá trình chống án không thể xúc tiến nhanh được, và chúng tôi dự tính trước là vụ chống án có thể kéo dài từ nửa năm tới một năm để quyết định vụ án. Hơn nữa, thông thường thuyết phục Tòa Phúc Thẩm lật ngược lại quyết định của toà dưới là một việc khó khăn. Tuy nhiên, chúng tôi sẽ cố gắng một cách mãnh liệt để thực hiện điều đó.

Tôi hiểu rằng đây là quyết định làm cho chúng ta thất vọng. Tuy nhiên, xin qúy vị tin chắc là chúng tôi sẽ theo đuổi việc chống án một cách quyết liệt. Nếu qúy vị muốn biết thêm tin tức, xin đừng ngần ngại liên lạc với chúng tôi

§ §

TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO SỐ 12

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Appeals Court

No. 2004-P1653

LUYEN HUU NGUYEN,BUI DIEM

DINH TU NGUYEN,SANG P. LE. BATUONG

NGUYEN,XUAN M. TRAN,NAM NHAT PHAN

LIEM THANH NGUYEN, AND CHUC V. NGUYEN

Plaintiffs - Appellants.

WILLAIM JOINER CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF

WAR AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND THE

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, BOSTON

Defendant - Appellee.

On appeal from a judgement of the Suffolk Superior Court

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

Michael P. Joyce

Associate Counsel

BBO #567292

University of Massachusetts

225 Franklin Street, 12^th Floor

Boston, MA 02110

617-287-7030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………...................................................................I

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………………….............................................................iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW………………………………................1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE………………………………..........................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS………………………………........................................................5

STANDARD OF REVIEW………………………………................................................................7

SUMMER OF THE ARGUMENT……………………………….....................................................9

ARGUMENT………………………………....................................................................................11

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PLAINTIFFS’

COMPLETE FAILURE TO APPLY FOR THE FELLOWSHIPS DEFEATED THEIR

CLAIM OF M.G.L.C. 151B EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION………………………11

A. Plaintiffs fail to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because they did

not apply for the fellowships………………………………...................................12

B. No discriminatory inference can be drawn from the defendant’s methods

of advertising the year 2000 fellowships ………………………………...................14

C. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the “futile gesture doctrine” to excuse their failure to

apply for the 2001 and 2002 fellowships because that failure was based

merely on their subjective belief that they would not be awarded

the fellowship and not based on any specific discriminatory action

action by the defendant……………………………….........................................16

II. THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED

TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR M.G.L.C. 151B AGE DISCRIMINATION

BECAUSE DISPERATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS ARE NOT

RECOGNIZED IN MASSACHUSETTS AND THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED

TO ALLEGE THE AGE OF TWO OF THE FOUR FELLOWSHIP

RECIPIENTS……………………………….................................................................19

A. Disparate impact age discrimination claims are not

recognized in Masschusetts……………………………….........................19

B. The plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to establish a claim of

disparate treatment age discrimination because they fail to allege

the ages of two out of the four 2000 fellowship recipients and fail

to allege the age of the 2001-2002 fellowship recipients…………………20

III. THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE

PLAINTIFFS ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A PROTECTED CLASS

SOLEY DEFINED BY POLITICAL BELEIFS AND THUS NOT

PROTECTED BY THE ANIT-DISCRIMINATION LAWS OF THE

COMMONWEALTH……………………………….........................................21

A. The plaintiffs fail to allege that any practice of policy of the defendant

had a disparate impact on the protected class with respect to

national origin………………………………..............................................22

IV. THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE

PALINTIFFS’ M.G.L. C. 151C CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO STATE

A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED…………………27

A. The complaint does not allow that the plaintiffs are seeking admission

as “students” as required by M.G.G. C. 151C, s2(a)………………………27

B. The complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs were “seeking

admission to a program or course of study leading to a degree by

required by M. G. L. c. 151c s2(d)……………………………...................28

C. The “creed of Communism” is not protected by M. G. L. c. 151c…………31

D. All plaintiffs failed to file a complaint with the MCAG alleging

M.G.L. c. 151c education discrimination……………………………….......34

I I

V. THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT IT

HAD NO JURSDICTION TO RULE ON THE CLAIMS OF CERTAIN

PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE THESE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO FILE

COMPLAINTS WITH THE MCAD PRIOR TO INITIATING THEIR

SUIT IN SUPERIOR COURT………………………………......................................35

A. Plaintiffs Bui Diem, Dinh Tu Nguyen, Sang P. Le, Ba Tuong, Xuan M.

Tran, Nam Nhat Phan, Liem Thangh Nguyen, and Chuc V. Nguyen did

did not file complaints with the MCAD and, therefore , cannot maintain

under M.G.l. c. 151B or 151C in Massachusetts Court. ……………………35

B. This defense was not waved by the Defendant because it is a

jurisdictional defence and cannot be waived, and was nonetheless

timely raised in its response to the plaintiffs’ Second Amended

Complaint. ………………………………......................................................38

C. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Christo v. Edward C. Boyle Ins. Agency to

support their claim that the MCAD filing requirement can be

ignored by the Massachusette courts is misplaced and greatly

exaggerated the relevance of its holding to the case at bar. ………………….40

CONCLUSION………………………………..................................................................43

ADDENDUM

A. Memorandum of Decisin and Order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

B. M.G.l. c. 151B, ~4

C. M.G.L. c. 151B, ~5

D. M.G.L. c. 151B, ~9

E. M.G.L. c. 151C, ~2

III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barret V. City of Worcester sch. Dept., 2001 WL 1602832 (MCAD 2002)………..30

Bowen v. Wynne Sch Dist., Colonnade Hotel,2 MDLR1400 (MCAD, 1974)……..18

Chambers v. Wynne Sch Dist., 909 F.2d 1214 (8^th Cir. 1990) ……………………..14,15

Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems 293 F. Supp. 2^nd 622 ( E.D. Va .

2003) ………………………………..........................................................................23,26

Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc, 417 Mass. 580 ( 1994)……………………………....35,42

Christo v. Edwards G. Boyle Ins. Agency Inc., 402 Mass. 815 (1988)………………passim

Cox v. New England Tele. & Tele. Co., 414 mass 375 (1993)……………………….12

Curtis v. City Fitchburg, 2003 WL 21500532 ( Mass, Super. 2003)………………….38

Dorman v. Norton Co., 2003 WL 1962458 ( Mass. Super. 2003)…………………….39

EEOC v. Consolidated Services Sys. 777 F. Supp. 599 ( N.D. Ill. 1991)…………… 14,15

EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Uniond, Local 1066, 48 F. 3^rd 594 (1^st Cir. 1995)………..22

Espinoza v. City of Worcester Ret. Sys., 414 U>S> 86 (1973)……………………….22,25

Figueroa v. City of Worcester Ret. Sys,, 18 MDLR 132 (MCAD 1996)……………..12,13

Flebotte v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc. 51 F. Supp 2^nd 36 (D. Mass 1990)…………………20

Green v. Moses Gill, Executor, 5 Mass. 379 (1809)……………………………...........39

Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp 996 (D. Mass, 1979)…………………………….............16

Harvard Law School Coalition of Civil Rights v. President & Fellows of

Harvard College, 413 Mass. (1992)…………………………….................................22, 26

Int’l. Bhd. Of teamsters v. United States, 413 U.S. 324 (1977)……………………..16, 17

Jamgochian v. Dierker, 415 Mass. 565 (1977)…………………………….................39

Jarosz v. Palmer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 834 (2000)……………………………..............8, 9

Knight v. Avon Products, inc. , 438 Mass. 413 ( 2003)……………………………...20,21

Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F. 3^rd 456 ( 1^st Cir. 1996)…………………………..34

Leo v. Plymouth Dist. Ct. 18 MDLR 60 ( MCAD 1996)……………………………16, 18

Lewis v. Boston Public Health Comm’n 25 MDLR 353 (MCAD 2003)……………17

Lewis v. Tabacco Workers Int’l Union, 577 F. 2^nd 1135 ( 4^th Cit. 1978)……………18, 19

Littleton Business Sys. V. Comm’r of Revenue Mass. 619 (1981)………………….39

Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 371 Mass

186 (1976)……………………………......................................................................32

Mole v. Univ. of Massachusetts, 58 Mass App. Ct. 29 (2003)………………………34

Mouradin v. General Eletric Co., 23 Mass App. Ct. 538 (1987)…………………….35

Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F. 3^rd 696 ( 1^st Cir. 1999)……………………………..20

O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,517 U.S. 308 (1996)………………20, 21

Oliver v. Holyoke Community College, 2001 WL 1602767 (MCAD 2001)………..30

Opinion of the Justices of the House of Representatives, 423 Mass. 1244

(1996)…………………………….......................................................................22, 23, 33

Sampson v. Lynn 405 Mass. 29 (1989)…………………………….....................8, 9

Santiageo v. The Children’d Place, 18 MDLR 151 (MCAD 1996) ……………12, 13

Sereni v. Star Sportswear Mfg. Corp. 24 Mass App. Ct. 428 (1987)……………36

Smith College v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221

(1978) ………………………………...................................................................11,13,34

Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. 549 (1994)…………………………….....................8

Storey v. Burns int’l Security Service, 390 F. 3^rd 760 (3^rd Cit. 2004)…………..23,26

Terrill v. Chao, 31 Fed. Appx. 99 (4^th Cir. 2002)……………………………....23

Thompson v. Musser, 1 U.S. (1Dall.) 458 (1789)……………………………...39

Williams v. Frank, 757 F. Supp. 112 ( D. Mass 1991)…………………………23, 26

Winbush v. State of Iowa By Glenwood Sate Hops. 66 F 3^rd 1471

(8^th Cir. 1995)…………………………….........................................................17

Wolfe v. Gormally, 440 Mass. 699 (2004)……………………………............31, 32

Wright v. Hollingsworth Lessee, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 165 (1828)…………………39

Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination,

43 Mass. 655 (2000)……………………………..............................................11,12,13

Statutes and Rules

Mass. Acts. Of Gen. Ct. 2000 c. 223, ~~ 1.4.…………………………….......38

Mass. R. Civ. P. 12.…………………………….............................................9

M.G.L. c. 151B, ~~4.……………………………..........................................32

M.G.L. c. 151B, ~~5.…………………………….......................................36,38

M.G.L. c. 151B ~~9.…………………………….......................................................32

M.G.L. c. 151C………………………………...........................................................Passim

Secondary Sources

The American Heritage Dictionary 299 (2^nd College ed. 1991)………………………33

CIA World Factbook, Vietnam at http://.www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

geos/vm.html……………………………….............................................................24

The Vietnam War Almanac, Harry G. Summers, Jr. (3^rd ed. 1999)………………….24, 25

VII

STAEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether the Superior Court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs/ complaint for

Discrimination in a failure-to-hire case where none of the plaintiff’s

Applied for the postion in question?

II. Whether the Superior Court correctly found that the plaintiff’s complaint

Failed to state a claim for M.G.L. c. 151B discrimination because the

Complaint sought protection for a class of people defined solely

By their political beliefs ?

III, Whether the Superior Court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ M.G.L.

C. 151C claim because: the plaintiff’s failed to allege that they were

(a) seeking admission as students or (b)”seeking admission to a

Program or course of study leading to a degree, beyond a bachelor’s degree”

( c ) the “creed of Communism” is not pretected by that statute; and (d)

all plaintiff’s failed to fillling their complaint in Superior Court.

IV. Whether the Superior Court correctly found that it had no

Jurisdiction to rule on the M.G.L. c. 151B claims of eight of the nice

Plaintiff’s because those plaintiffs failed to file any complaints with

the MCAD prior to filing their complaint in Superior Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 27, 2000, plaintiff Luyen Huu Nguyen (“Luyen”) filed a complaint

At the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) against the

University of Massachusetts, Boston, Claiming a single count of employment discrimination

Under M.G.L. c. 151B ~~4. App. 24-25. *. On April 25, 2001, Luyen moved to have his

Compaint treated as a “class action” at the MCAD. App. 97-101. On May 23, 2001, the

MCAD denied this motion for a class action. On Spetember 12, 2001 Pursant to Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss, the MCAD dismissed his comlaint and issued a finding that Luyen’s

Compaint lacked probable casue. App. 28 -31. The MCAD’s order of dismissal stated:

Complaint failed to establish prima facie case of disperate treatment/

Failure to hire. Complaint failed to establish that he applied for the

Position. Complaint, through his own admission, states that he did

Not submitt an application as he did not hear about the fellowship

Untill after the successful candidates were selected.

App. 105.

On October 29, 2001, plaintiff Luyen and eleven named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a

________________________

* Citations to the Appendix, prepared by the plaintiffs-Appellants, are referred to throughout this brief as “ App. (#) “.

proposed class of Vietnamese-Americans over 40 years old, filed a complaint in Suffolk

Superior Court alleging employment discrimination, in voilation of M.G.L. c. 151B. Plaintiff

Filed a Motion to Maintain Class Action on January 10, 2003 which the court denied from the

from the bench after a hearing. The Court’s order stated:

Plaintiff…….has failed to demonstrate that the proposed class members

Share common questions of law and fact in this employment

discrimination claim, which is of dubious merit in itself. Specifically,

the claim rests on the questionable premise that the defendt’s alleged failure

To more broadly advertise four research positions (two of which were

filled by Vietnamese) constitutes a violation of Chapter 151B.

App. 182

Shortly after the issuance of this order, the plaintiff’s former cousel, James P. Keane,

moved to withdraw from the case.

On November 20, 2003, Attorneys Bradley S. Clanton and James C. Duff

appeared Pro Hac Vice on behalf of the plaintiffs in this case. On Febuary 4, 2004, plaintiffs

filed An Asseent to Motion to Amend Complaint. This motion explicity preserved the

Defendant”s rights under M.R..C.P. 12 and 15. App. 186 -187.

On August 27, 2004 the Superior Court, after a hearing, allowed the Defendt’s

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Sate a Claim upon which relief could be granted and

For lack of jurisdiction, stating inter alia:

The defendant’s Memorandum of law in support to their Motion sets

forth numerous reason why the Motion toDismiss should be allowed.

(e.g. failure to echaust administrative remedies, plaintiffs are not students

or individuals undertaking a course of study.) Without repeating all of

those arguments, this Court simply notes that these reasons provide

Alternative grounds for this action should proceed no further. This

Court, however, prefers to dispose of the defendants’ Motion based

on a more fundamental defect in the plaintiffs’ case: none of the

plaintiffs applied for the fellowship positions. The plaintiffs’ repsonse to

this is to allege that they would have applied in the year 2000 had

they known about the fellowship, but that the method of advertising

the positions was itself discriminatory. As to the two subsequent

years in which the fellowships were offered, plaintiffs argue that

although they knew about the fellowship opportunity, (Luyen) had

already filed a discrimination complaint before the MCAD such

that all of the plaintiffs believed at that point that any attempt by

them to seek a fellwoship would be futile. This Court finds no

merit to these arguments.

App. 211 - 212 (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiffs hve filed a timely notice of

appeal of the Superior Court’s decesion, as well as their brief. The defendant now files this brief

in response to plaintiffs/ appeal .

STAEMENT OF THE FACTS*

On July 27, 1999, the defendant University of Massachusettes, Boston (“University”)

And its academic center, the Willaim Joiner Center for the study of War and social Consequence

(“Center”) received grant money from the Rockerfeller Foundation to establish research

fellowships for the study of the Vietnamese Diaspora (“fellowships”). App 189. These

fellowships were intended to allow research into the Vietnamese identity in the post - war

and post - refugee eras. App.190.

The plaintiffs are all “Vietnamese-American citizens or permanent United States

residents, over the age of 40, with a “national origin” in South Vietnam. App. 200. All of

them immigrated to the United States following the fall of Saigon in 1975 and in the years

thereafter. App 192 - 195.

On January 4, 2000, the Center distributed information to the public about these

fellowships by way of press release and letter. App. 198. This notice did not include the

application process or requirements, but did include a deadline of January

______________________________

* This statement of Facts is derived from the sixty-two allegations in plaintiffs’

allegations in plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, which begins on page 189 of

the Apppendix.

31, 200 for the applications. Id. The fellowships were also advertised in the publications

Hop Luu and Van Hoc. App. 199. In addition, a poster outlining the application process

was distributed after January 31, 2000. App.198

During the above time frames, plaintiff Luyen was living in Boston, Masschusetts,

but did not learn about the existence of the fellowships untill April 11, 200, when he

read a copy of the January 4, 2000 press release distributed by the Center. App. 192,198.

Luyen made no attemt to appy for the year 2000 fellowship, or when it was

subsequently offered in 2001 and 2002. App. 198,2oo.

On May 12, 2000, Luyen learned that the Center awared this year 2000

fellowship to two individuals who were “admitted agents of the Communist Party

of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,” one Caucasian-American by birth under age

of 40, and one person of Vietnamese-America descent of approximately 25 years

of age. In June of 2000, Luyen told the rest of the plaintiffs named in the

complaint (“remaining plaintiffs”) about the fellowships and the Center’s 2000

selections. Id.

The remaining plaintiffs lso failed to apply for the fellowships for the year 2000,

and decided not to apply in years 2001 and 2002 “due to the legal proceedings

instituted against the defendants,” snd “based on a reasonable belief that they would have

been discriminatorily rejected had they actually applied.” App 200. All plaintiffs believe

that the successful 2000 fellowship candidates were far less qualified for the

fellowship for the fellowships than any of the named plaintiffs. App 199.

Specifically, the plaintiffs charge in their complaint that the “actions of

the Defendants, including the timing and methods of the advertisement,

publication, and announcement of the fellowships , and the evaluation and selection

of the fellowship recipients, were taken with the deliberate, improper, and

illegal intent to exclude members of the Vietnamese-American community over

the age of 40, including the Plaintiffs.” App.200.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a judgement dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted (“rule 12b (6”), the Court must accept as true all

allegations of the complaint and all

reasonable inferences which mya be drawn from the complaint. See Spinner v, Nutt,417 Mass.

549, 550 (1994)/ Thus, both parties are limited, on an appeal of a 12(b) (6) motion, to the

facts that are alleged in the complaint. See id.

A rule 12(b) (6) motion is considerably different from a Rule 56 summery judgement in

that a Rule 12(b) (6) motion is based on the pleadings and tests the legal sufficiency of the

complaint. See Sampson v.Lynn, 405 Mass. 29, 30 (1989). Evidnece obtained through discovery

is outside the scope of review, unlike a Rule 56 motion which does permit such evidence. * See id.

____________________________

* Because the case at bar is an appeal of a 12(b) (6) motion, the plaintiffs’ attempt

call this Court’s attention to “certain evidence revealed in discovery” is clearly improper.

See Spinner v. Nutt, 417 Mass. At 550; Sampson, 405 Mass at 30. (Brief of

Appelants, pg. 29 ftn. 16)

Additionally, the plaintiffs try to sxpand the scope of the Court’s inquiry by

referencing facts alleged in a totally separate and unadjudicated case, ( Brief of

Appellants, pg 35 ftn.20). They cite Jarosz v. Palmer, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 834

(2000), to support their contention that the court “may take judicial notice of….

allegations” that have been made in another pending case between parties before

the court. (Brief of Appellants , pg. 35 ftn. 20 ) (Emphasis Added)

In Jarosz this Court held that the reviewing court must accept as true all

well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint unless the court knows

because of some other already adjudicated case, that

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Superior Court correctly dismissed the plaintiff’ complaint. The plaintiffs

failed to allege thaty they applied for the fellowships, and thus cannot establish a prima facie case

of hiring discrimination. The plaintiffs failto allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant’s

method of advertising the 2000 fellowship was discriminatory. With regards to the 2001 and 2002

fellowships, the plaintiffs’ calim that it would have been futile to apply does not excuse the

Fact that they did not apply for the fellowships. This theory of futility is based on the

Plaintiffs’ subjective belief that the defendant would have rejected their applications of

plaintiff Luyen’s pending MCAD action and was not based on any discriminatory act

by the defendant . Such a subjective

__________________________________________________________________________

the factual allegations in the present case are not true. See Jarosz, 49 Mass. App. Ct.

at 835-36. In so holding, this Court was not epanding the univers of factual allegations

that the court must take as true but instead allowing the reviewing court to dispose of

certain allegations it knew to be false, because the factual issues had already been

decided in a previous case. See id. Again, the plaintiffs’ attempt to persuade the court

to consider alleged facts in a case that has not even been decided yet and not alleged

in the complaint is clearly improper and violates the Commonwealth’s Rules of

Civil Procedure. See Mass. R. Commonwealth’s Rule of Civil Prodedure. See Mass.

R. Civ. P. 12. See also Sampson, 405 Mass. at 30.

belief cannot be the basis for claiming futility in a failure - to - hire case.

Also, the Superior Court was correct in holding that the plaintiffs’ attempted

to establish a protected class soley defined by their political belief, rather than by national

origin or age. It is well well-settled law in Massachusettes that poitical belief cannot

form the basis for the protected class under M.G.L. c. 151B or c. 151C. Additionally,

on the plaintiffs/ M.G.L. c. 151C laim, the Superior Court correctly found that the

plaintiffs were not students as eefind by the statute and were not seeking admission

to a program offering an advanced degree, as required by the statute.

Finally, the Superior Court correctly found that it lacked jurisdiction over

the claims of certain plaintiffs, based on their failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. All but one plaintiff failed to file a claim of discrimination with the

MCAD prior to bringing this claim in the Superior Court as required by the laws

of this Commonwealth. The plaintiffs’ contention that the defendant wavied this

defense by not raising it in its answer to the plaintiffs’ original complaint ignores the

well -

Settled doctrine that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be wavid, as well as long-established

rules of pleading. The defendant properly raised this defense in its response to the

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and did not waive it.

ARGUMENT

I. THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE

PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLETE FAILURE TO APPLY FOR THE

FELLWOSHIPS DEFEATED THEIR CLAIN OF M.G.L.C. 151B

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.

In order to establish a prima facie claim of age and national origin

Discrimination pursuant to M.G.L. c. 151B in a failure- to - hire, case the plaintiffs

must show that (1) they are a member of a class protected by M.G.L. c. 151B;

(2) they applied for an open position: (3) they were not selected: and (4) the employer

sought to fillthe position by hiring another individual with similar qualification. *

Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 655 n. 22

(2000). Moreover, proof of discriminatory motive is “ critical” in disparate treatment cases.

Smith College v. Mass. Comm’n

______________________

* Failure to hire cases are similar to failure to promote cases with regards to prima facie

elements and fact patterns. ( i.e. employer seeking to fill a postion, applicant or

current employee seeking to obtain position). Therefore, this brief will also cite to failure

to promote cases.

Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 22l 227 ( 1978). Although the plaintiffs are pemitted

to establish disperate treatment through direct ot circumstantial evidence, the plaintiffs have

the burden of proving intentional discrimination. Cox.v. New England Tele. And Tele. Co. ,

414 Mass. 375, 384 - 5 (1993).

It is well established law in Massachusetts that a plaintiff claiming discrimination

in a failure - to - hire lawsuit must establish that he actually applied for the job. See, e.g.

Wynn & Wynn P.C. v. MA Comm’n Afainst Disrim. 431 Mass 655, 665 n. 22 (2000)

(noting plaintiff’s application for job is in an element for a prima facie failure - to -

hire case); Santiago v. The Children’s Place, 18 MDLR 151,152 (MCAD 1996) (same);

Figuero c. City of Worcester Retirement Sys. 18 MDLR 132, 134 ( MCAD 1996).

(same.)

A. Plaintiffs fail to establish a rrima facie case of discrimination because they

did not apply for the fellowships.

The plaintiffs’ complaint specifically states the none of the plaintiffs applied

for the fellowship positions at any time. App. 198-200. Not only did all plaintiffs

fail to apply for the fellowship when it was first offered in 2000, but they also failed

to apply for the fellowship when it was offered in 2001

For the fellwoship

And 2002. Id. After learning that two alleged “communists” were awarded two of the

year 2000 fellowships, the plaintiffs decided to file a lawsuit instead of filing their

application. App. 107. None of the plaintiffs applied for the fellowships, thus none

of them can establish a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to hire. See e.g. ,

Wynn & Wynn P.C., 431 Mass. At 665 n. 22; Santiago, 18 MDLR at 152; Figuero, 18

MDLR at 134.

Moreover, by not applying for any of the fellowships, the plaintiffs have

forever deprived the defendant of the opportunity to rebut any claim of direct

disparate treatment towards the plaintiffs. The defendant never had an opportunity to

consider the candidacies fo the plaintiffs because they were unaware of their existence.

Because the defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiffs or their intent to apply for the

Fellowships , it is impossible for the plaintiffs toever prove that the defendant possessed

a “discriminatory motive” towards any of the individual plaintiffs. Smith College,

376 Mass. At 227 (proof of discriminatory motive is critical to a showing of

disparate treatment) .

B. No discriminatory in ference can be drawn from the Depfendant’s methods

of advertising the year 2000 fellowships.

Despite the plaintiffs’ contention that the method of advertising the year 2000

fellowships was discriminatory, as the Superior Court stated, the mere fact that the defendant

Chose to adverise as they did is not evidence that it intended to discriminate against the

Plaintiffs. App. 212 ( J. Sanders, Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss). See also EEOC v. Consolidated Services Systems, 777 F. 599, 607

( N.D. Ill., 1991) ( fact that the employer advertised in Korean-language newspaper

does not demonstrate the he harbored intent against non-Koreans).

As long as the defendant advertised the position and had no knowledge of the

plaintiffs’ interest in the fellwoship, no inference can be made from the chosen method of

advertising. See Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist. 909 F. 1214,1217 (8^th Cir. 1990) ( in a

failure to promote case, court held that where the employer advertised the position and

did not know about the plaintiff’s interest in the jon, no inference of discrimination can

be made with respect to the methods of adverising).

As the plaintiffs allege, the defendant advertised the fellowships. App 198 - 199. They

acknowledge that the press release and letter were sent out weeks before the application

deadline and that the fellowships were advertised in two journals, Hop Luu and Van Hoc. Id.

The plaintiffs fail to allege that the defendant knew that any of the plaintiffs were interested in

the fellowships. Thus, discrimination cannot be inferred from the defendant’s method of

advertising the fellowships. See Chambers, 909 F. 2^nd at 1217; Consolidated Services

System, 77 F. Supp. At 607.

Common sense dictates that the defendant cannot be expected to individually

contact every person that could conceivably be interested in the felowship in order to

ensure that they are notified of the open position. Responsibility for meeting deadlines and

seeking help in applying must be placed on the applicant once the public has been

reasonably notified of the opening. As the Superior Court stated, nothng about the method of

advertising gives “ rise to any rational inference of age discrimination” or raises the

presumption that “ the defendants intended to or

did exclude” the defendants from applying for fellowship. App.212.

C. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the “futile gesture doctrine to escuse their failure

to apply for the 2001 and 2992 fellowships because that failure was based

merely on their subjective belief that they would not be awarded the

fellwoship and not based on any specific discriminatory action by the defendant.

The plaintiffs attempt to excues their failure to apply for the 2001 and 2002

fellowships by claiming that it would have been futile for them to apply. Under the

“futile gesture doctrine” a plaintiff does not have to appy for a position in order to

establish a prima facie claim of discrimination if he can overcome “the not always easy

burden” of showing that they would have to applied for the job if not for the employer’s

obstruction. Int’l. Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,365 (1997). See

also Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1068 ( D. Mass. 1979); Leo v. Plymouth Dist. Ct. , 18

MDLR 60 62 (MCAD 1996).

While creating an exception to the application requirement, courts have made it clear

that a claim of futility cannot be based merely on the plaintiffs’ subject belief that they would

not be hired. This belief must be coupled with evidence of actual

discrimination by the defendnt. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365; Lewis v. Tabacco Workers

Int’l Union, 577 F. 2^nd 1135,1463 (4^th Cir. 1978). ( holding that claim of futility cannot be

based on subjective belief of the plaintiffs but instead on some objective discriminatory

action taken by the employer).

In order to avail themselves of this expection, the plaintiffs” complaint must

allege that the defendant made statements to the plaintiffs in order to deter them from applying

for the fellowships or that the defendant had a systemtic policy or repeated discrimination

such that one would reasonably deterred from applying for the fellowships. See, e.g.,

Teamsters , 413 U.S. 324 ( failure to apply not required because of the company’s

systematic policy regarding senority and also because applicants were given false ot

misleading information about the availability of the position). Winbush v. State of Iowa By

Glenwood State Hosp. 66 F. 3^rd 1471, 1481 (8^th Cir., 1995) ( court found that application

was not required either the position was not advertised or the employer misled them to

believe that applying would be futile) ; Lewis v. Boston Public Health Comm. 25 MDLR

353, 355 56 ( 203) ( plaintiff’s failure to apply for job that

Was essentially a reposting of the jon she was just fired from was excusable because

employer misled her to believe that postion was being eliminated: Leo, 18 MDLR at 62

( applicant could reasonably have inferred that it would have been futile to apply because

employer had falsely told her that he already chosen someone else) ; Bowen v. Colonnade

Hotel, 2 MDLR 1400, 1402, 1409 ( MCAD 1974) ( futile for applicant to apply for

position when employer misled he by telling her that position was no longer available).

The claim of futility that plaintiffs advance in their brief is similar to the one

rejected in Lewis v. Tabacco Workers International Union. 577 F. 2^nd at 1143. In Lewis, the

4^th Cirtuit refused to find discrimination where the plaintiffs did not actually apply for the

job. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that they bleived it was futile to apply for certain positions

because the company kept blacks and whites segregated. See Lewis, 577 F. 2^nd at 1137, 1142.

They did not show that the employer actually discriminated in hiring or intended to keep

blacks and whites separate. See id.at 1492. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims, the court

stated that a claim of futility must be based on some direct evidence that

the employer did in fact discriminate. See id. at 1143. The mere subjective belief that they

would not be hired, as the plaintiffs claim in the case at bar, is not sufficient to claim

futility. See id.

The plaintiffs failto allege that any official from the University of Massachusetts

gave them falseor misleading information about the fellowships or told them not to apply.

Nor do they allege that they were deterred from applying because of a systematic policy on

part of the defendant to discriminate. Rather, the plaintiffs claim that they did not apply

because they believed they would be refected because plaintiff Luyen filed a complaint with

the MCAD. App. 200. Because their claim of futility rests solely on their subjective belief,

the Superior Court was correct in holding that their failure to apply for this fellowship barred

the plaintiffs’ M.G.L. c. 151B claim.

II. THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS

FAILED TO ESTABLISH A CLAIM FOR M.G.L.. C. 151B AGE DISCRIMINATION

BECAUSE DISPARATE IMPACT AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS ARE NOT

RECONGINIZED IN MASSACHUETTS AND THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO

ALLEGE THE AGE OF TWO OF THE FOUR FELLWOSHIP RECPIENTS.

A. Disparate impact age discrimination claim are not recongnized in Massachusette.

There is no cause of action for disparate impact as discrimination in Massachusetts.

The first Circuit has held that inder both Massachuetts and Federal law, age discrimination

claims grounded on a theory of disparate impact are not viable. Mullin v. Raytheon Co. ,

164 F. 3d 696, 697. 704 I 1^st Cir. 1999) (analysis of Massachussetts decision on viability

of disparate impact age claims) ; Felbotte v. Dow Jones & Co. , 51 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44

(D. Mass 1999).

The Superior Court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ disparate impact age

Discrimination claim because such a claim is not recongnized by Massachusette court

thus the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

B. The plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a claim of disparate

treatment age discrimination because they fail to allege the ages of two out of

the four 2000 fellowships recipients and fail to allege the age of any of the

2001 - 2002 fellwoship recipients.

Age discrimination may only be logically inferred when the postion is given to

someone who is “substantially younger” than the plaintiff. O’Connor v. Consolidated

Coin Caterers Corp. 517 U. S. 308, 313 (1996) ; Knight v. Avon Products, Inc. 438 Mass.

413, 422 (2003) (holding that an age disparity of less than

Five years, by itself, is too insignificant to support a prima facie case of age discrimination).

The plaintiffs failto allege the age of the remaining two recipients of the year

2000 fellowships. * Additionally, the plaintiffs fail to allege any characteristics, including

their age, of the people selected for the 2001 or 2002 fellowships.

In thei complaint the plaintiffs state that

(t)he Defendants selected candidates ( for the 2000 fellowship) with insufficient

qualifications, no experience fo the Vietnamese Diaspore, and in some instances

admitted agents of the Communist Party of the Socialist Republice of Vietnam.

(Of the four candidates selected one was) under the age of 40 (and another was)

approximately 25 years of age. The candidates selected were far less qualified

than the Plaintiffs.

App. 199.

Absent the alleged ages of all the people selected for the fellowships, no logical

inference of age discrimination can be made. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 313 ; Knight,

438 mass. At 422. This, the plaintiffs fail to establish a prime facie case of age disrimination.

III. THE SUPRIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS

ATTEMPTED TO ESTABLISH A PROTECTED CLASS

_________________________

* The Superior Court noted this and reasoned that such a failure would necessarily defeat the

plaintiffs’ claimof age discrimintion. App. 212, ftn. 2.

SOLEY DEFINED BY POLITICAL BELEIFS AND THUS NOT PROTECTED

BY THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

In order to establish a prima facie case of age and nationail origin discrimination,

the plaintiffs must allege that the defendant’s practice or policy had a disparate impact on

members of a protected class to which he or she belongs. EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union,

Local 1066, 48 F. 3d 594, 601 (1^st Cir. 1995). The Supreme Judicial Court has held that

M.G.L. c. 151B does not protect discrimination founded on policticail or social beliefs. See

Opinion of the Justices of the house of Represemtatives, 423 Mass. 1244 (1996); Harvard

Law School Coalition of Civil Rights v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 413

Mass 66. 68 - 70 (1992).

A. The plaintiffs fail to allege that any practice or policy of the defendant had a

disperated impact on a protected class with respect to national origin.

The Supreme Court has defined “national origin” as referring “ to the country where

a person was born, or, mor broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came. Espinoza

v. Farah Manufacturing Co. , Inc. 414 U. S. 86, 88 ( 1973).

Groups of people who sahre the same country of origin have not been afforded national

origin status based on the individual region or sections of that country. Claim of national

origin discrimination on the basis of being a southern (Confederate) American have been

Rejected because southern Americans are not distinct from northern Americans. See Storey

v. Burns International Security Service, 390 F. 3d 760. 762-63 (3^rd Cir. 2004) (“Confederate

Southern America” is not a protected class); Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems, 293 F.

Supp. 2d 622, 628 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing Terrill v. Chao, 31 Fed. Appx. 99 (4^th Cir. 2002)

(“Confederate American” cannot claim national origin discrimination because plaintiff could

not claim a distinct physical identity)); Williams v.Frank, 757 F. 112, 120 (D. Mass 199l)

(Southerness is not a protected trait). In these cases, the courts rejected any notion that there is

a distinction between Americasn from the south and from the north. The courts also rejected the

claim that Confederate Americans are a distinct group because they share some common culture

or history of persecution. See Storey 390 F. 3^rd 760, 762 - 63.

All of the paintiffs allege that they were born sometime between 1923 ( Plaintiff Bui

Diem) and 1942 (Plaintiff Nam Nhat Phan). App. 192 - 185. During this entire time, the

country now know as Vietnam was part of the French protectorate of Indochina ( officially

known as the “ Indochinese of Union”) and was not knows as “South Vietnam” or the

“Republic of Vietnam.” The Vietnam War Almanac, Harry G. Summers, Jr. 16 (3^rd ed.

(1999) * (in 1887 France formed the Indochinese Union that included Vietnam, which

lasted until 1945, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed). As the

plaintiffs point out, the political entity known as South Vietnam lasted for only twenty-one

(21) years, from 1954 to 1875. (Breif of Appellants, pg. 39). South Vietnam did not sxist

when the plaintiffs were born and does not exist as a country today. See Summer, supra, at 16.

Today, the area where the plaintiffs were born in is officially known as the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam. CIA World Factbook, Vietnam, at

_________________________

*The Vietnam War Almanac by Harry G. Summers, Jr. is the same source the plaintiffs

cite to support their argument that Vietnam did not exist as a “catch all” classification.

While this source is not included in the Appendix, the Defendant requests that this

Court take judical notice of the historical fasct contained therein.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/vm.html ( last modified June 2, 2005) .

Additionally, contary to the plaintiffs’ claim, the “catch all” classification of the

“Vietnamese” people has existed for more than one thousand years. (Brief of Appelants,

pg. 39). “Vietnam is one of the world’s oldest nations. It’s legendary past stretch(es) back to the

third millennium BC……..” Summers, supra, at 2. For nearly nine hundred years, beginning in

946 AD when Vietnam won its independence from China until 1867 when France made it a

colony, Vietnam was an independent and sovereign nation. Summer, supre, at 3, 13, 16.

throughout this entire nine hundred year period, the Vietnamese people developed a

sophisticated governmental structure, a distinct language, and their own version of Buddism.

Summers, supre, at 5. Any clain that Vietnam and its people did not exist historically as a

single and distinct country is not historically accurate. See Summers, supra, at 2.

This, under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court the plaintiffs’ claim of

national origin discrimination would be one of “Vietnamese” and not “South Vietnamese”.

See Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88.

In claiming their orgin as “South Vietnamese” the plaintiffs are attempting to

distinguish themselves from those who hold similar national traits, I.e. Vietnamese, who

happen to reside in the north of the country. The complaint does not allege any distinct

physical characteristics between these two groups. The only distinction between these

two groups in found in their respective political ideologies. As stated above, M.G.G. c. 151B

does not recongnize this distinction. See Opinion of the Justices, 413 Mass. At 1246; Harvard

Law School Coalition of Civuil Rights, 413 Mass. At 68 -70. The distinction claimed by the

plaintiffs is similar to the distinction claimed by “Confererate Americans” which has

Repeatedly been refected by courts. SeeTorey, 390 F. 3^rd at 762 - 63; Chaplin, 293 F. Supp.

2d at 628; Williams, 757 F. Supp. at 120.

Under the accepted standard, the national origin that is being claimed by the plaintiffs

should be that of Vietnamese” or at least a classification that is the same as three out of the

four fellowship recipients. Thus, their M.G.L. c. 151B claimnesessarily fails because three of

the four

fellowships were filled by Vietnamese. * Such undisputed facts show that any actions took

did not discriminate against any group of people sharing the same national origin of the

plaintiffs.

IV. THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS’

M.G.L. C. 151C CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO SATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH

RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED.

A. The compaint does not allege that the plaintiffs are seeking admission as

“students” as required by M.G.L. c. 151C ~~2(a) .

M.G.L. c. 151C ~~ 2 (a), prohibits educational institutions from discriminating against

“any United States citizens seeking admission as students basis of race, religion,creed, color, or

national origin.” (Emphasis added). The plaintiffs in their complaint fail to allege that they

were seeking admission as “students”.” On the contrary, the comlaint alleges that the Fellowships

were treated as “employees” and completed IRS Form W-4 and were issued a W-2 for income

Purposes. App. 197. The plaintiffs allege that the fellowship positions were subject to the

University’s Hiring Guide and

_______________________

* In addition to their M.G.L. c. 151B clain, the fact that three out of four fellowships were

Filled by Vietnamese also defeats the plaintiffs’ M.G.L. c. 151C claim. M.G.L. 151C requires

a prima facie showing of discrimination against a protected the class of “Vietnamese-Americans”

Has been alleged.

Should have coml.ied with the policies of the Human Resources Department at the University.

App. 196 - 197. As pled, the fellowship positions were clearly not educational but instead

were employment positions. Accordinly, such positions do not fall under the protection afforded

by c. 151C .

B. The complaint does not allege that the plaintiffs were “seeking admission to a

program or course of study leading to a degree beyond a bachelor’s degree”

as required by M.G.L. c. 151C, ~~2(d).

M.G.L. c. 151C, ~~ 2 (d) prohibits discrimintion against “any person seeking admission

to a program or course of study leading to a degree beyond a bachelor’s degree…” (emphasis

aded.) As stated previously, the complaint fails to allege that any plaintiff actively sought

admission to any program at the University because they failed to apply for the fellowships.

Additionlly, the complaint fails to allege that the fellowships were a “program or course of study

leading to a degree beyond a bachelor’s degree.” On the contrary, the complaint alleges that

the fellowships were a “program or course of study leading to a degree beyond a bachelor’s

degree. On the contrary, the complaint alleges that the fellowships were “temporary and/or a

grant-funded positions”, governed by the University Hiring Guide and that the Center was

required to "consult with HR prior to filling any temporary position in order to

insure that the University's hiring polocies and procedures were followed: App. 196

The plaintiffs argue that M.G.L. c. 151C protects any person seeking admission

to any "program" even if it does not lead to a degree beyond a bachelor's degree. ( Brief of

Applellants, pg. 49). Such a stance clearly misreads the statute and seeks to broaden the scope

of M.G.L. c. 151C beyond what the legislature intedned.

A reading of M.G.L. c. 151C ~~2(d), in its entiretu, reveals that "program" and

"course of study" are both modified be the clause "leading to a degree, beyond a bachelor's

degree." This subsection also prohibits discrimination against " any student admitted to

such program or course of study in providing benefits, privileges and placement services."

Id. (emphasis added). The placement of the word "such" before " program" and "course of

study" reveals that the legislature was referring to a specific type of program and course

of study. The word "such" refers back to the only possible modifier in the sentence, and

that is "leading to a degree, beyond a bachelor's degree".

That such a interpretation could lead to the"absurd" result that M.G.L. c. 151C would

not prohibit discrimination against students in non - adcanced degree programs, does not

grant this Court the authority to rewrite the statute. Contrary to the plaintiffs' unsubstantiasted

assumption regarding the "intent of the legislature in drafting c. 151C," M.G.L. c. 151C

does not prohibit all acts of discrimination in eduction. See Barret v. City of Worcester Sch.

Dept., 2001 WL 1692832 (MCAD 2001) (no redress for discrimination against students

once they are admitted to a scondary school).

In Oliver c. Holyoke Community College, 2001 WL 1891767 (MCAD 2001), the

MCAD highlighted the limitations of M.G.L. c. 151C, and regretfully admitted that they

lacked authority to "amend a statute deemed to be inconsistent and therefore lacking in

essential protections for students:. Id. Thus, regardless of its limited protection for "all students"

seeking admission to programs leading to advanced degrees. Plaintiffs have failed to allege that

the fellowships lead to any degree, and have consequently failed to state a proper claim.

statute ,must also be interpreted "so as to make it an effetual piece of legislation in harmony

with common sense and sound reason" and that it "must be viewed as a whole" and that

"it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed." Wolfe, 440 Mass.

at 704 I citing Masasachusetts Commn'n Against Disrcrimination v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. ,

371 Mass. 186, 190 (1976).

Under this, standard, c. 151C must be viewed as a whole. M.G.G. c. 151C is unique in

that it does not establish an independent right of action. All c. 151C claims must be brought in

court under c. 151B, ~~9. (Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a practice made unlawful......

under chapter one hundred and fifty-one C,....may....bring a civil action for damages...."

M.G.L. c. 151B ~~9.) This in order to give effect to this provision, c. 151C must be

interpreted in conjunction with c. 151B. M.G.L. c. 151B does not define "creed" to include

political thought or beliefs.

M.G.L. c, 151B ~~ 4 explicitly states that:

"(T)he words 'creed or religion' mean any sincerely held religious beliefs,

without regard to whether such beliefs are approved, espoused, prescribed

required by an established church or

other religious institutions or organizations." (Emphasis added.)

"Communisim" is defined as "(a) system of government in which the state controls the

means of production and asingle, often authoritarian party holds power." The American

Heritage Dictionary 299 (2nd College ed. 1991). Some interpretations of the communist

doctrine may prohibit certain religious beliefs but, as the definition above suggest, the

movement is a "system of government," not a religious institution or organization.

In Opioion of the Justices, 423 Mass. at 1246, the court held that there is no

claim for discrimination based on political beliefs in Massachusette. In that case, the

court repeated that M.G.L. c. 151B only offered protection for "religious beliefs"

and did not extend that protection of political thought. Id. at 1245 - 6. Furthermore,

there are no reported decisions in Massachusetts holding that M.G.L. c. 151C extends

protection to political thought, and such a protection is also not found in the body of

c. 151C. Any effort to broaden the definition or creed to include the creed of

communism

ignore the context in which M.G.L. c. 151C is placed and unjustifiably adds language to

the statute.

D. All plaintiffs failed to file complaints with the MCAD alleging M.G.L.

c. 151C education discrimination.

A plaintiff alleging disrimination cannot plead new claims that he did not

orginally raise before the MCAD, Mole v. Univ. of Massachusette, 58 Mass. App. Ct.

29, 47 (2003) (citing Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F. 3d 456,464 (1st Cit. 1996). The

Supreme Judical Court has noted that trial courts "must view critically any legal theory

now claimed" that was not presented at the MCAD. Smith College, 376 Mass. at 224-4 (noting

trial court judge should have disregarded new factual conclusions not advanced before the

MCAD).

Plaintiff Luyen failed to allege c. 151C eduction discrimination in his October 27,

2000 complaint filed with the MCAD, App. 24- 25. Luyen's MCAD complaint is limited

to a single claim of employment discrimination, and failer to mention any allegation of

"education" discrimination. Id. Moreover, plaintiffs' inital complaint filed in this action

failed to allege a c. 151C violation. App. 107 - 120.

Therefore because Luyen failed to raise any claims M.G.L. c. 151C claims at the MCAD, the

Superior Court was correct to conclude that it lacked Jurisdiction and dismiss this claim.

V. THE SUPERIOR COURT WAS COEECT IN CONCLUDING THAT IT HAD NO

JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE CLAIMS OF CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS BECAUSE

THESE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO FILE COMPLAINTS WITH THE MCAD PRIOR TO

INTIATING THEIR SUIT IN SUPEROR COURT.

A. Plaintiffs, Bui Diem, Dinh Tu Nguyen, Sang P.Lee,Ba Tuong Nguyen, Xuan M. Tran,

Nam Nhat Phan, Liem Thangh Ngyen and Chuc V. Nguyen did not file complaints with

complaints with the MCAD and, therfore, cannot maintain actions under M.G.L. c. 151B

or 151C in Massachusette Court.

A party must file a timely complaint with the MCAD in order to maintain an action

under M.G.L. c.151B or c, 151C in Massachusetts Superior Court. Charland v. Muzi Motors,

Inc., 417 Mass. 580, 583 (1994): Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Ins. Agency, Inc., 402 Mass.

815, 816 (1988). "Resort to the courts is not available for a complaint of discrimination

with in jurisdiction of the MCAD unless the person claiming to have been the object of

unlawful discrimination first makes a timely complaint to that agency." Charland, 417

Mass. at 583 - 84. The court will dismiss a complaint unless it was initially filed with the

MCAD on a timely basis. See Mouradin v.

General Electric Co., 23 Mass App. Ct. 583,541 (1987) ( barring plaintiff from rising

claims in Superior Court when plaintiff did not file timely with the MCAD) ; Sereni

v. Star Sportswear Mfg. Corp., 24 Mass App. Ct. 428, 429-30 (1987) (affirming

directed verdict when plaintiff did not file M.G.L. c. 151B claim with the MCAD).

Finally, all such complaints must be filed with the MCAD within 30 days of the alleged

discriminatory act, or they will be time-barred. M.G.L. c. 151B ~~ 5.

In the case at bar, all plaintiffs, with the exception of plaintiff Luyen and his

M.G.L. c. 151B claim, failed to file a complaint with the MCAD for the claims that are

contained in the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Second Amended

Complaint does not allege any of the plaintiffs filed any action at the MCAD. Despite the

plaintiffs' failure to plead this basic jurisdictional requirement in their complaint, the

defendant will condede that on October 27, 2000, Plaintiff Luyen filed a complaint with

the MCAD, listing himself as the sole complainant in an action against the William Joiner

Center, and failed to name or mention any of the remaining plaintiffs in this complaint.

App. 86 -87. Plaintiff

Luyen later moved to amend his complaint at the MCAD to add a class action. App. 97 - 101.

This motion was opposed by the Iniversity and denied by the MCAD. App. 28 - 31. This

decision was not appealed and the remaining plaintiffs never failed individual complaints

with the MCAD. App.22. In addition, the MCAD decision denying Luyen's compaint lists

a single complaint filed by Luyen and makes no mention of the existence of any other

complaints to that action. Aoo 28 31.

Therefore, because the remaining plaintiffs failedto file individual MCAD

complaints and failed to satisfy a condition precedent to filling a c. 151B suit in

Superior Court, the Superior Court was correct in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to

hear the plaintiffs' claims.

Additionally, the remaining plaintiffs are time- barred from filing complaints at the

MCAD and thus can never satisfy a condition precedent to filling their claim in Superior

Court. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the remaining plaintiffs first learned about the

defendant's alleged disriminatory acts in June, 2000. App. 199. All c. 151B discrimination

complaints must be filed with the MCAD within 300 days.

of the alleged discriminatory event. * "M.G.L. c. 151, ~~5. Thus, the remaining plaintiffs

had until approximately April, 2001 to file individual complaint with the MCAD. They

failed tofile any individual complaints with the MCAD> therefore, the remaining

plaintiffs are time barred from filing complaints with MCAD and they will never be

able to fulfill this condition precedent to filing a c. 151B claim in Superior Court.

Thus their claims were rightly dismissed with prejudice by the Superior Court.

B. This defense was not waived by the Defendant because it is

a jurisdictional defense and cannot be waived, and was nonetheless ,

timely raised in its response to the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

Recent Superior Court decisions have ruled that filing a complaint with the MCAD is

a jurisdictional requirement for a plaintiff to sure in Superior Court.

___________________

* The statute of limitations for actions filed in the MCAD was 180 days at the time of the

alleged discriminatory act in this matter, (May or June, 2000). This limitation period was

extended prospectively to 300 days effective November 5, 2000. See Mass. Acts of Gen.

Ct. 2000 c. 223~~ ~~ 1, 4. Thus, the 180 day limitation peroid, rther than the 300 day

period, may apply to the conduct alleged in this complaint. Under either analysis, the

plaintiffs are time barred.

2003 WL 21500532 (Mass. Super. 2003) ; Dorman v. Norton Co., 2003 WL 1962458 (Mass.

Super. 2003) .

Claims of lack of jursdiction cannot be wavied by either party. See e.g. Jamgochian

v. Dieker, 425 Mass. 565, 567 - 68 (1997) ( partyy's failure to raise jursdictional claim

does not bar it from raising it later because jurisdictional claims cannot be wavied) ;

Littleton Business Sys v. Comm'r of Revenue, 383 Mass. 619, 622 (l981) ( subject

matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, conduct, or wavier).

It is well-settled law that "(w)henever the plaintiff ameds his declaration, the defendent of

course has liberty toreplead..." Green v. Moses Gill, Executor, 5 Mass. 379, 380 (1809).

See also Wright v. Hollingsworth Lessee, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 165, 169 (1828) ( upon

admendment being made to declaration, the defendant had a right tio plead de novo) ;

Thompson v. Musser, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 458 (1789) ( it is error to allow an amendment

to the complaint without giving the defendant the opportunity to answer) .

Despite the plaintiffs' contention, the defendant did not waive its degense that

certain plaintiffs' failure to file in the MCA barred their claims in Superior Court. The claim

was made in the Defendant's

Memorandum of Law in Suppert of its Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' Amended Complaint .

App. 8 - 11 . The plaintiffs argue that because the defense was not raised in the answer to

the first complaint any subsequent response is barred from raising it. ( Brief of Appellants,

pg. 45 - 46).

The plaintiffs ignore long-standing principles of responsive pleading when they

attempt to limit the defendant to its answer to the orginal complaint. The defendant has a

right to respond to any claim put forward by the plaintiffs. This degendant exercised this

right in a timely fashion by filing its motion to dismiss. App. 1-2. Defendant's Motion

Dismiss raised the claim that certain plaintiffs failed to file in the MCAD. App. 6-11.

Thus, the claim was not waived and was properly accepted by the Superior Court.

C. Plaintiff's reliance on Christo v. Edward C.Boyle Ins. Agency to support their claim

that the MCAD filing requiremtn can be ignore by Massachusette courts is

is misplaced and greatly exaggerates the relivance of its holding to the case

at bar.

The plaintiffs cite to the Superme Judical Court's decision in Christo v. Boyle

Ins. Agency, 402 Mass 815 (1998) , to support their

contention that a defense of failure to echaust administrative remedies can be waived

by the defendant, (Brief of Appellants, pg. 44 - 45)

In Christo, the court rerterates the well - settled rules that " before intiating ( a

discrimination claim under M.G.L. 151B ~~ in Superior Court) the plaintiff must have

filed a timely complaint within six months of the act of discrimination ( with the MCAD)"

Christo, 402 Mass. at 817. While the court stated that this requirment , is cubject to

equitable tolling, it did not decide whether the limitation should be tolled in that case ,

but remanded it for decsision by the Superior Court. Id. at 817 , 819. The court

simply held that the Superior Court was not bound by the MCAD investigator's

determination of the tolling question. Id. at 818. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, (See

Brief of Appellants, pgs. 44 - 48), the court did not state that the MCAD filing requirement

could be ignored by the Superior Court. See id.

Additionally, at most, the court implied that the tolling of the MCAD filing

requirement could be allowed if there was some showing that the defendant misled the

plainftii or discouraged her from filling a timely complaint with the MCAD. Christo, 402 Mass

816. The plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that they were misled or discouraged

by the defendant from filing a clain with the MCAD. In fact, the plaintiffs offer no

explanation for the plaintiffs' failure to file in the MCAD. The fact that plaintiff

Luyen was able to make a timely complaint in the MCAD is evidence that the other

plaintiffs had the opportunity to satisgy the filling requirements of M.G.L. c. 151B

but, for reasons not mentioned in their complaint, failed to do so.

Without alleging any effort on the part of the defendant to mislead or dissuade

the plaintiffs from filing acomplaint with the MCAD, the requirement that the

plaintiffs first file in the MCAD cannot be wavied by the defendant. See Charland, 417

Mass. at 583; Christon, 402 Mass at 816.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests that the Superior

Court's decision allowing the motion to dismiss and the order dismissing the complaint

be affirmed.

Dated: June 20, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

UNVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTES,

BOSTON.

By Their Attorney,

Michale P. Joyce (BBO#567292)

Associate Cousel

Office of the General Cousel

University of Massachusettes

225 Franklin Street,

12th Floor

Boston, Massachusettes 02110

(617) 287 - 7030

ADDENDUM